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Abstract: This article explores how the multiplication of labour migration categories relies 
upon strategic territorialisations of borders to differentiate between workers’ nationalities, 
worksites, and skills in Finland.  We argue that for certain categories of workers, migration 
policies encourage workers to become mobile in ways that make them more precarious. We 
analyse worksites that show the different ways that labour is made mobile: the 
internationalization of higher education; Finnair’s labour outsourcing and offshoring 
practices; and the recruitment of forest berry-pickers from Thailand. We first trace 
contentious migration politics in Finland, revealing conflicts over labour protections, 
universal labour rights, the state’s obligations to create employment, economic 
competitiveness, national identity, and the precarisation of work. We show how practices of 
legal, procedural, and spatial differentiation particularise the conditions of work and argue 
that, even for skilled workers, the strategic territorialisation of borders works to differentiate 
between workers and work sites. This differentiation works to make labour mobile in 
multiple ways and, due to the selective territorialisation of labour protection, the political 
geographies of labour migration in Finland tend towards the precarisation of labour for 
skilled and unskilled workers alike.  
Keywords: Migration, Precarity, Borders, Territorialisation, Labour 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, the Finnish Parliament interrogated Finnair Airlines (a majority state-owned firm) 
over human rights violations in its Chinese cabin crew: dismissal for pregnancy, participation 
in industrial action, and marriage to a foreign citizen. In the two years following, Finnair laid 
off Finnish cabin crew, placed remaining workers on unpaid furloughs, and outsourced 
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international cabin crew services, leading MPs, unions, and the media to call for greater 
protection of workers by the state majority shareholder.  In 2013, around 50 Thai berry-
pickers sued Finnish berry processor Ber-Ex Oy for human trafficking violations of 
fraudulent recruitment practices and debt bondage (Seppälä & Thuren 2013). Low berry 
yields meant that workers paid by volume, rather than hourly wages, were left without 
enough money to return to Thailand. Both of these cases drew media, Parliamentary, and 
international human rights observers’ attention, leading to public debates about the role of 
Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in Finnish workplaces, economy, and national culture. 
These struggles show how labour is increasingly made mobile, differentiated and relocated to 
across borders. Moreover, these struggles over labour rights, mobility, and citizenship status 
have unfolded alongside broader struggles over neoliberal economic restructuring, work 
conditions on construction sites (Lillie 2010), the internationalization of Finnish higher 
education (Paasi 2015, Moisio and Kangas 2016), and mass layoffs in Finland’s industrial 
sector.  
In this article, we trace struggles amongst state ministries, state-owned firms, labour 
unions, MPs, courts, and migrant workers in Finland to show how borders and labour have 
been reworked across the spectrum of skilled work, producing multiple forms of mobile 
labour, borders, and precarity.  In doing so, we bring together previously isolated research on 
the multiplication of borders and labour, migrant precarity, and Nordic state restructuring to 
show how the political geographies of migration are a critical, but often overlooked, site for 
respatialisation of territory, law, and labour rights. Analysing low-skilled berry-pickers, 
skilled unionized state-owned Finnair cabin crew, and highly skilled international 
researchers, we trace how international mobility has become a precondition for work. In other 
words, we analyse how different actors use national borders to produce labourers in various 
ways. We argue that while migrants and asylum-seekers are often deskilled, made to work in 
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exploitative conditions, and suffer exclusion from labour markets (see Lewis et al. 2015) in 
ways that render them immobile, work sometimes requires mobility and relocation.   
As Mezzadra and Nielson (2013) argue, borders have become a key site of 
articulation for capital, especially as a means of differentiating between labourers according 
to skill level, nationality, race, gender, and class. For them, both borders and labour have 
been multiplied, precisely in relation to one another, as a range of state and economic actors 
use borders to create territories of regulatory exception (see also Peck 2017) and workers 
dependent on employers for visa status. Borders have also become spaces of struggle over the 
conditions of work, the right to mobility, asylum, and identity (Belcher, Martin & Tazzioli 
2015; Garelli & Tazzioli 2017) in addition to the proliferation of walls, detention centres, and 
non-state immigration policing (Jones et al. 2017). While we resist the tendency to generalize 
borders and overstretch analytic purchase, we must grapple with borders as complex 
institutions performatively produced by everyday bureaucratic practices, cultural institutions, 
and workplaces (Anderson, Klatt & Sandberg 2012; Paasi & Prokkola 2008; Mountz 2004; 
Rajaram & Grundy-War 2007). Changing border, asylum, and migration regimes also signal 
changes in the spatiality of sovereignty (Mountz 2011; Jones et al. 2017). For Mezzadra and 
Nielson (2013), these changes have made global space heterogeneous: a single point on the 
map will be criss-crossed by international, regional, and national regulations. In other words, 
territory has been “debordered” (Sassen 2013), revealing not a static state space but a 
“flexible territoriality” (Novak 2011). These scholars have, in short, problematized the 
presumed coherence between territory, legal jurisdiction, immigration status, and rights, and 
argued that they are in fact political technologies (Elden 2010; Coleman 2008; Paasi 2009).  
In this article, we advance this work by showing how these technologies of government are 
made to work through banal administrative visa decisions, ministry policy-making, and 
labourer litigation strategies.  
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For knowledge workers, berry-pickers and cabin crew, labour is increasingly made 
mobile precisely through recruitment, visa regimes, and short term work contracts: a strategic 
mobilization of labour and fixing of workplaces to ensure fewer employer responsibilities to 
workers. We show that, in addition to the demobilization of precarious migrants (Waite 
2009), the multiplication of borders and labour are predicated on the mobilization of labour. 
We analyse struggles over three different workplaces in Finland to show both the context-
specific ways in which borders and labour are multiplied and to show how international 
mobility has become essential to the “differential inclusion” of workers across the skill 
spectrum. Debates over the multiplication of borders and labour have focused on the 
exclusion of migrants from labour protection regimes altogether. Similarly, research on 
migration control, detention, and emerging geographies of sovereignty (Mountz 2011, Jones 
et al 2017) has not traced the ways in which labour is made mobile, and that it is made mobile 
in order to relocate work to spaces with fewer worker protections. Similarly, research on 
migrants’ precarity has focused on immigration status, poor work conditions, and social 
exclusion but has said less about how citizen-workers have also been made “migrantized” 
(with the exception of Garelli & Tazzioli 2017). We do not question the justifiable focus on 
the dire human costs of immigration regimes, but here seek to make connections between the 
very processes that render people, citizens, and workers differentially precarious. Research 
and organizing around precarity has problematized the flexibilisation of labour through short-
term and zero-hours contracts, part-time work, non-unionized workplaces, high youth 
unemployment, offshoring manufacturing and outsourcing state services. Finland’s shift from 
corporatist to competitive economic management (Ahlqvist & Moisio 2014) has demanded 
different kinds of workers, namely globally oriented, multi-lingual, highly skilled engineers 
(Moisio & Kangas 2016). To date, analyses of precarity, the multiplication of borders, and 
Finland’s emergent competitive state have remained separate. By bringing together case 
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studies from different parts of a segmented national and international labour market, we want 
to show the ways in which the differentiation of labour and borders also includes the 
differentiation of precarity. We argue that the multiplication of borders and labour requires, 
in the case of Finland, the mobilization of labour and, through this mobilization, a de- and 
reterritorialization of workplaces, labour protections, and citizenship status.  
Below we elaborate our approach to borders, migration, and precarity and describe 
how this approach informed our methodology. We then contextualize our three case studies 
in Finland’s state restructuring, migration policy-making, and Europeanization. We illustrate 
these changes through the internationalization of higher education, a case that demonstrates 
the centrality of internationally mobile knowledge workers for Finland’s economic 
development. We then turn to Finnair cabin crew and forest berry-picking to show how the 
mobilization of differentiated labourers and the strategic territorialisation of the workplace 
intersect to produce specific, but all too familiar, forms of precarity.  Analysing these cases 
alongside each other allows us to illuminate both the highly specific ways in which particular 
workers are rendered mobile and the general way in which mobility has become a 
precondition for work. 
BORDERS, MOBILITY AND PRECARITY  
 Migration studies scholars have traditionally explained labour migration in terms of 
push-pull factors and economic differences between states, north and south, or core and 
periphery. Recent scholarship, however, has focused on how international labour migration is 
shaped by state migration policies (Massey 1999; Raghuram & Kofman 2002; Samers 2010), 
supranational actors like the EU (Leitner 1997; Kofman, 2002; Cerna 2013; Geddes & 
Nieman 2015; Menz 2015; Paul 2013, 2015), international organizations like the 
International Organization for Migration (Ashutosh & Mountz 2011; Andrijasevic & Walters 
2010), transnational corporations (Millar & Salt 2007), recruitment brokers and agencies 
 6 
 
(Kern & Mueller-Boeker 2015; Sporton 2013), and other facilitators (Andersson 2014; 
Gammeltoft-Hansen & Sörenson 2013). These approaches challenge the view that ‘the 
migrant’ is the problem to be solved and, in turn, question the status of the migrant as an 
object of study (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). Rather, the myriad interdisciplinary studies of 
enforcement show how states produce illegal immigration through legal categorization, 
policing, and securitization (Andersson 2014; Bigo 2001; Bosworth 2014; De Genova and 
Peutz 2010 Coleman 2005, 2008; Huysmans 2006; Martin 2012; Mountz 2010; Gill 2016). 
As Mezzadra and Nielson (2013) show, skilled labour categories for international migrants 
activate temporal and spatial borders to craft low-cost labour supplies. 
The implementation of the Schengen Agreement and EU free internal mobility for EU 
citizens forced cooperating states to negotiate the sovereign right to manage non-citizens on 
their territory (Leitner 1997). The Schengen Agreement was incorporated into the legal 
framework of the EU in the Treaty of Amsterdam and sought to create more flexible and 
mobile labour force and, therefore, a more favourable environment for international 
investment. Migration policy has become increasingly supranational and a number of EU 
directives concerning labour migration from third countries have harmonized policies across 
the EU (Blue Card Directive 2009/5, Single Permit Directive 2011/98, the Seasonal Workers 
Directive 2014/26 and the Intra-Corporate Transferees Directive 2014/66) (see more 
Verschueren 2016). Yet, member states retain the right to determine the volumes of 
admission of the work permits for TCNs (Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
79/5; see more Reslow 2012; Cerna 2013) and what income levels are set for family 
reunification, for instance.  In practice, national regimes are still the most influential in 
setting out policies for entry, settlement and integration and in determining the employment 
and social security rights of different categories of migrants (see also Kofman 2002; Reslow 
2012; Paul 2015). The admissions of “highly skilled” migrants are linked with the question of 
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human capital, regional economy, innovativeness and knowledge transfer (Lee & Nathan 
2013; Paul 2015) whereas TCN migration schemes are addressed as security problems (Bigo 
2002; Neumayer 2006) and often as a burdens to national economy.   
The EU labour mobility regime multiplies labour categories, working to include them 
along differentiated access to rights, wages, protections, lengths of stay, and access to 
services or benefits. EU and Schengen policies result, therefore, in the production of a multi-
tiered migration system, which has been further differentiated by skill-based visa systems in 
individual states (Van Houtum & Pijpers 2007; Van Houtum, 2010; Carrera et al. 2011; Paul 
2015). This hierarchization of migrants’ different legal statuses accompanies longer trends of 
civic stratification, the social and political construction of migrants rights and the systems of 
inequality which operate through the formal, institutional techniques of inclusions and 
exclusion and the more informal deficits that shape the delivery of rights and protection 
(Morris 2003: 79). Intra- and non-EU labour migration have been key sites of European 
integration and policy development, and recent conflicts over refugee resettlement and the 
suspension of Schengen and Dublin rules demonstrates that it remains a key sight of migrant, 
intra-state, and geopolitical struggle (Geddes 2008; Geddes & Niemann 2015). From the 
perspective of labour mobility and labour rights, EU regulations have worked to both allow 
companies to seek lower wage costs and to ensure relatively uniform protections for workers 
(see Lillie 2010, 2012). In the case of countries like Finland, where citizen workers are often 
compensated beyond the minimums stipulated in industry-wide collective bargaining, 
migrant labour has allowed companies to both comply with local laws and replace local with 
cheaper migrant labour. Offshoring production to zones of regulatory exception is a spatial 
strategy that relies upon bounded territorial spaces, and—crucially—upon the differences in 
wages and regulations between them (Lillie 2010, 2012). Similarly, labour subcontracting 
and international labour recruitment rely upon differences in citizenship status to constitute 
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different kinds of labourers. While both appear to exemplify the porosity of borders in the 
context of globalized capital flows, these practices demonstrate how states participate in 
constituting the conditions of labour mobility. The multiplication of borders and labour has 
also produced new conditions of labour precarity. 
Lewis et al. (2015) argue that while borders, immigration laws and socio-legal status 
are present but submerged concepts in migrant labour exploitation scholarship, they create 
“hierarchies of precariousness within labour markets” (p. 590) that should be conceptualized 
as a continuum of precarious labour that illuminates both extreme and mundane experiences 
of forced labour. While their research focuses on ‘hyper-precarious’ migrants in the UK, here 
we are interested in how labour market regulations, territorial boundaries, and immigration 
rules produce “differential exposure” (Harker 2012) to precarious working and living 
conditions. As Waite (2009) argues, immigration status intersects with labour market 
experiences in contextually specific ways. In the case of Finland, producing flexible labour 
has presumed labour mobility, and the production of mobile labour has relied upon spatio-
legal production of contextually specific forms of precarity.  Moreover, our case studies show 
how particular critiques of Finland’s rigidity and inflexible labour protections have valorised 
mobility itself as a way of making labour flexible. We do not argue that Finnair flight 
attendants and higher education workers experience the same kinds of precarious work and 
legal status as Thai forest berry-pickers, but we do think it is important to show the common 
ways in which labour mobility and the strategic territorialisation of labour protections operate 
differentially to produce a spectrum of labour precarity. We also diverge from other work 
emphasizing how socio-legal status, exclusions from institutions, and poverty lead to 
immobilization. We show that making labour mobile is key to the differentiation of labour 
because it allows for the strategic bounding of labour rights to particular workplaces. 
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  While others have pointed to the flexibility of territoriality (Novak 2011), our analysis 
pays attention to the strategic territorialisation of borders and struggles between different 
interest groups. The strategic territorialisation approach to labour migration parallels with, yet 
also complicates, the prevailing understanding of borders as something that do not only 
materialize at the physically located and marked borderlines but the enacted effects of a 
border can take place both within state territory and extra-territorially (Johnson et al. 2011), 
sometimes in a very creative and surprising ways. The shift from the borderlines towards a 
more fluid understanding of borders, however, does not mean that “borders are everywhere” 
or that their functions and effects are the same for all people. Instead, as Burridge et al. 
(2017: 13) put it “borders come into force through disparate, disconnected practices, through 
failures and gaps in services” thus providing security and welfare for some while denying it 
from others, also in a differentially exclusive manner. Our analysis shows the importance of 
territorial strategies for the analysis of the multiplication of labour, a question that, we argue, 
has been overseen by Mezzadra and Neilsen (2013). Mezzadra and Neilson approach the 
question of migrant labour from the perspective of migrant categories and the resistance of 
the categorization by migrants themselves; however, they pay less attention to the struggle 
over different rationales and interest groups within and in-between state territories. Below, 
we seek to fill this gap in their work to show how “official” struggles over migration politics 
multiply when and where borders appear—as well as where, when, and which working 
people count as labourers.   
METHODOLOGY 
Our methodological approach emerges from questions about labour mobilization and 
strategic territorialisation of labour rights and our conceptualization of borders’ 
heterogeneity. As Michael Samers argues, studies of immigration policy should include 
“struggles within institutions, representatives of capital and the plural needs and voices of 
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civil society” and connect immigration discourses to “material dimensions like labour 
demands, competition over local resources and international obligations in the form of 
‘human rights’” (Samers 2003, 575-6). Similarly, borders and immigration scholars 
understand state border policy not as one entity but as a “strategic terrain” where various 
countervailing politico-economic interests come to bear on one another (cf. Coleman 2005: 
200; see also Mountz 2010). In order to analyse the discursive and physical mobilization of  
foreign labour, we collected and analysed legal statutes, negotiations, Parliamentary 
proceedings, employment office judgements, recruitment practices, company liability 
judgments, legal rulings on labour status, residency permit decisions, Schengen visa 
decisions, Finnish Migration Service (Migri) guidance documents, yearly calculations of visa 
allocations, human rights interrogations, and contracts. We included textual data and 
quantitative statistics produced by relevant organizations. We have limited our data collection 
to documents, which we understand to manifest particular acts in the struggle over migration 
and border regulation (cf. Prokkola 2013). While interviews with stakeholders would have 
allowed us to include different individual perspectives, we do include testimonies from a 
wide range of stakeholders and institutional discourses, enabling us to explore struggles 
between groups of people over the organization of labour and borders. These documents are 
also authoritative, representing policy guidance that is then implemented (through further 
documentation), and so while we do not present ethnographic accounts of precarious work 
experiences our analysis covers diverse, polyvocal, and highly contentious textual discourses 
on migration policy in Finland.  
We conceptualise these documents, speeches, rulings, statistics and policies as 
technologies of government, “the actual mechanisms through which authorities of various 
sorts have sought to shape, normalize and instrumentalise the conduct, thought, decisions and 
aspirations of others in order to achieve the objectives they consider to be desirable” (Miller 
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& Rose 2008, 32). By analysing how different actors situate migration in relation to their 
other priorities, we show how struggles over labour protections, economic competitiveness 
and the state’s role in the national economy unfold through struggles over the strategic 
territorialisation of borders. This allowed us to identify divergent public discourses of labour 
mobility, where it is seen to contribute to nation-building projects and where it is understood 
to threaten them. Our methodological approach allowed us to identify contextually-specific 
discourses alongside global patterns of labour flexibilisation, especially the importance of 
labour market competitiveness in Finland’s migration policy-making and the strategic use of 
foreign jurisdictions and citizens in achieving certain forms of competitiveness. Specifically, 
we analyse how labour is differentiated in order to make work and workers mobile through 
the strategic use of jurisdiction and national territories to limit labour protections, wages, and 
obligations. In other words, we trace how labour is made mobile through the selective 
territorialisation of migration categories and worksite protections. We analyse specific 
bordering practices—workers’ nationality, legal boundaries of workplaces, and visa 
regimes—as socio-technical practices that authorize certain people to move across Schengen 
and national borders for specific periods of time. We argue that it is crucial to attend to the 
specific technical practices through which this multiplication occurs—and how it renders 
workplaces and workers mobile. What we find is that the multiplication of labour and borders 
unfold together, and they do as much through policies that seek to cultivate competitive 
national economies and societies as through policing, exclusion, and expulsion.  
 
MOBILISING LABOUR AND POLITICISING MIGRATION  
Here we focus on Finland’s relationship with migration to draw out context-specific socio-
technical practices of bordering and labour. During the Cold War period, national integrity, 
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the Keynesian welfare state and employment were the key pillars of national policy-making 
in Finland. The government practiced active regional and social policy, including active 
ownership policy and the establishment of state-owned industries, to achieve full employment 
and social coherence of the nation (Moisio 2012). Kantola and Kananen (2013) note that 
labour market policies have been a particularly important—and depoliticized—site where 
competitive state values of economic growth and international investment replaced welfare 
state values of redistribution. Where the Finnish welfare state considered unemployment a 
social ill, unemployment now represents available (and willing) labour as an economic good 
for foreign investment. Kantola and Kananen (2013) argue further that these changes were 
largely accomplished through technocratic fixes at the Ministry of Finance, and welfare state 
ideals remain highly popular to both citizens and political parties. Migration policy-making in 
Finland unfolds, therefore, in the context of 20 years of economic reforms that have striated 
and hierarchized labour in spite of popular disagreement with those policies.  
Recent migration policies have primarily aimed to address labour shortages, an aging 
workforce, and competitiveness in a global knowledge economy. Like many countries in 
Europe, Finland was a net emigration country until the 1990s (Geddes 2008). Urbanization in 
Finland has been slower than in other European countries and labour shortages in industries 
and urban areas have been managed with internal migration, especially from northern and 
eastern peripheral regions toward the urbanized south (Aro 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Finland’s employment, average incomes and gross national product were considerably lower 
than in the neighbouring Nordic countries, and significant numbers of Finnish people moved 
to Norway and Sweden for work (Wahlbeck 2015). This flexible labour mobility was made 
possible by the Nordic Common Labour Market Agreement (1954). Many of these workers 
returned in the 1980s, and in the 1990s they were joined by Ingrian and Swedish Finns, 
Estonians, and Russians (Łobodzińska 2011). Thus, international labour migration has long 
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been part of the Finnish economy, but focused on return migration of Finnish workers from 
abroad rather than international recruitment to Finland. 
 
Table 1. Immigration to Finland in 1990-2014 (Source: Statistics Finland). Note: Total 
immigration includes Finnish returnees. 
Migration trends changed following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Joining the 
European Union in 1995, Finland was an early member of the EU’s internal mobility regime, 
but EU membership did not produce significant levels of labour migration to Finland until the 
inclusion of eastern European countries in 2004.  
Non-citizen workers are currently regulated through Finnish, EU, and Schengen Area 
migration policies, though recent EU directives seek to harmonise basic minimums. EU 
citizens may work in Finland without a residency permit, but TCNs wanting to work for any 
length of time must apply for permission in the form of a visa or a residency permit. Other 
workers must apply for a residency permit, which depends on evidence of suitable salary. 
Residency permit applications are first submitted to a ‘labour market test’ by provincial 
Employment and Economic Development Offices; Migri then evaluates any statutory reasons 
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for denying the permit (EMN 2014: 9). Despite high rates of advanced degree attainment in 
Finland (OECD 2011), specialists, researchers, and consultants bypass the local labour 
market test. Intended to foster highly-skilled human capital, this practice differentiates 
‘knowledge economy skills’ from—and prioritises them over—other skilled and unskilled 
workers.  
Equal treatment is a cornerstone of the Nordic welfare ideology and, compared with 
the other parts of Europe, there is still a relatively strong agreement that migrants should have 
equal access to welfare benefits and protection (Keskinen 2016). At first glance, Finnish 
migration policy conforms to Ruhs and Martin’s (2008) theory of ‘numbers vs. rights,’ in 
which high income countries are expected to provide a relatively high set of employment 
rights to labour migrants and therefore to regulate the number of low-skilled migrants more 
than a country that provides less protection and rights. Our study of the strategic 
territorialisation of borders, however, shows a more complicated picture of bordering work 
regarding the techniques of regulation. Because principles of equal treatment bar restrictions 
on migrant rights, Migri has used other policies to differentiate between different labourers, 
deter family migration and minimize fiscal costs of migration. Changes in 2016 raised net 
income requirements from €1860 to €2600 per month for a family of four (Finnish 
Immigration Service 2017), which is well above the median salary of 2200-2300 (net) in 
Finland.  By setting such high barriers to admittance, the Finnish immigration service 
differentiates between deserving and undeserving migrants, frames migrants as burdens on 
the welfare state, and seeks to ensure that mobile labour remains temporary. Through these 
targeted administrative changes to TCN policy, Migri is able to deter and limit migration 
while adhering to principles of ‘equal treatment.’ By parsing labour migrants by nationality, 
skill category, degree, and 'income level and then by-passing labour market tests for highly 
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skilled TCNs, Finnish labour migration policy segments and multiplies labour, using the 
territoriality of national citizenship to differentially include Finnish, EU, and TCN labourers. 
Mobilizing Skilled Labour and the Competitive State 
Finland’s migration policies have developed against a backdrop of a highly dominant 
narrative of national competitiveness (Moisio 2012, Ahlqvist & Moisio 2014, Kantola & 
Kananen 2013). Critiques of Finland’s welfare state have relied upon a sense of continual 
crisis in Finnish political economy, a crisis that can be solved through a now familiar battery 
of neoliberal policy solutions: privatization of state enterprises; internationalization; internal 
competition for resources; workfare; move from industrial production to  knowledge 
economy society; the production of entrepreneurial, mobile, highly-skilled citizens (Moisio & 
Kangas 2016). And like other countries, the introduction of these policies has not unfolded 
smoothly, but has been incorporated into Finnish statecraft in a highly particular fashion. 
Finnish elite discourses promoting neoliberal strains of competitiveness appeal to both state-
centred and borderless, global spatial registers at the same time: “On the one hand, [the state] 
is charged with stepping aside and setting the stage for market functions, but on the other 
hand, the state needs to be active in creating an optimal business climate, foster competition 
with society…” (Ahlqvist & Moisio 2014: 31).   
As internationalization, competition, and innovation have dominated economic 
restructuring policies, transboundary labour mobility has become an increasingly visible site 
of structural change. Finnish visa regimes’ differentiation of mobile labour emerge from 
ongoing negotiations between ‘social partners’: politicians, labour unions, employer 
organizations, and other interest groups. The Aliens Act (5§) stipulates that labour market 
organizations participate in the decision making process and legislation: “The social partners 
participate in monitoring and assessing practices related to issuing residence permits for 
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employed persons, and in preparing national and regional policies related to the general 
requirements for using foreign labour.” Migration policy is, therefore, legally constituted as a 
site of negotiation, contestation and compromise between competing visions of Finland’s 
economy, cultural, and national identity. Here, we outline state, labour union, and employer 
organization platforms on labour mobility and then examine how these tensions have played 
out in Finnish higher education internationalization policies.   
For government representatives, Finland’s aging workforce and global 
competitiveness are its key concerns in migration policy-making: 
“The government will promote such labour based migration which strengthens 
employment and public finance, dependency ratio and the internationalization of 
economy. The whole Europe is aging and due to it, it has to solve the problems of 
deficit of public finance. Immigrants will strengthen the innovativeness and know-
how of Finland by bringing the strengths of their own culture as part of the Finnish 
society.” (Finnish Government 2015; translated from Finnish by author).  
Prioritizing the interconnection between migration and innovativeness on the agenda frames 
the interdependency of mobility and innovation as the path to state competitiveness. Finnish 
state research institutions, such as TEKES, have published reports highlighting the potential 
of highly-skilled migrants and suggested that migrant’s cultural diversity and international 
networks can bring new ideas and innovation. Their approach understands diaspora and 
“economies of diversity” as key components of innovation (Nathan 2015, Florida 2002) so 
that skilled labour recruitment is folded into the state’s innovation strategy, including higher 
education policies (Raunio 2015). For state agencies, labour mobility is human capital 
infrastructure for state competitiveness in recruiting foreign investment. International labour 
mobility is, then, key to building strategic territorial advantages in the global economy.  
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 Labour unions understand the situation differently. Union membership is high across 
sectors (75 percent of workers in 2013), and labour unions participate directly in labour 
migration policy-making and residency permit allocations. Historically, labour migration has 
been a marginal concern for unions (Aho 2015) but they have recently prioritised labour 
protections for all people living and working in Finland, noting that the boundary between 
permanent and temporary work is malleable, and temporary work can turn into permanent 
one (The Central Organisation of Finnish Trade Unions SAK 2013: 2). Finnish labour unions 
underline ‘equal treatment’ in workers’ rights and contracts, and their concern is that many 
migrants do not have unsatisfactory conditions of work and they may not be aware of their 
rights (SAK 2013). Temporary migrants are not usually members of the labour unions, and so 
those workers who have non-standard work contracts are in many ways outside the labour 
regulations and protection. Migration remains, however, an area of ambivalence: in some 
cases labour unions seek to prevent TCN labour migration by drawing attention to high 
unemployment figures in Finland and to the breaches of working conditions many migrant 
workers encounter.   
 Employer organizations, however, support increasing the migrant workforce not only  
because they presume it will increase labour flexibility for employers but because it will 
bring different kinds of workers to Finland. For business interests, the availability of low-
wage and flexible labour is critical for economic development, and this includes international 
labourers. From a free market perspective, Finland’s labour market is considered rigid: 
workers expect high wages, quality conditions, long contracts, limited and regular working 
hours, and they expect to stay in place.  An economic think tank oriented towards neoliberal 
economics, the Finnish Business and Policy Forum EVA argues that Finland’s sustainable 
regional development cannot be reached without migration (Myrskylä & Pyykkönen 2015). 
The report estimates that Finland needs approximately 34,000 net immigration yearly in order 
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to maintain a suitable labour force.  Migrant labour is attractive not only for filling gaps, but 
because migrant workers are perceived to be more “flexible” in accepting irregular hours and 
sporadic work:  “Immigrants are often accepting all kinds of jobs that are offered to them. 
Like students, part time jobs, irregular working times and weekend work suit them” (Myskylä 
& Pyykkönen 2015: 8; translated from Finnish by author).  Migrant workers are important to 
business interests not only because they offer more workers competing for jobs, but also 
because they are different kinds of workers. Here migrant status is marked by nationality and 
differentiates between workers’ character as workers. Migration shifts power from labour to 
capital because migrants appear less able/interested in joining the unions, are more willing to 
accept growing workplace control and because “immigration can discipline existing workers 
by reminding them how easily replaceable they are” (Scott 2013: 1101). In other words, 
migration policies’ differential inclusion according to skill and nationality produces 
variegated forms of precarity but delimiting workplace protections in space and time. While 
low-skilled and unauthorized labour precarity is well-documented (Waite 2009, Lewis et al. 
2015), Finnish migration and economic development policies increasingly expect that all 
workers will be more mobile. We argue that this mobilization of labour introduces specific 
forms of precarity across the skilled labour spectrum. Below we examine how higher 
education has become a key site for these policies and then return to Finnair’s highly mobile 
cabin crew and Thai berry-pickers’ to show how labour mobilization overlaps with strategic 
territorialisations of workplaces, as well. In doing so, we elaborate how the multiplication of 
labour and borders works to produce context-specific forms of precarity. 
Internationalizing Skilled Labour 
Internationalization policies in Finnish higher education are indicative—and 
productive—of the prioritization of internationally mobile knowledge workers in the 
reconfiguration of the competitive state. As a small state, Finland is seen to be particularly 
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vulnerable to the turbulence of the global markets, and “fostering specific capacities qualities 
in its population” is conceived as a possible solution to this dilemma (Moisio & Kangas 
2015: 10). Although there are no exact statistics concerning the education level of those 
migrants who move to Finland, fears of brain drain pervade competitiveness discourse 
(Johansson 2008; Niemiläinen & Korhonen 2017). Several studies found that the scarcity of 
internationality, and thus the loss of tacit knowledge that is understood to be embedded in 
international networks, was a major weaknesses of Finnish higher education and research. 
International networking and raising numbers of international staff of the universities has 
been presented as a means of achieving of competitiveness (Ministry of Education 2009: 15). 
Moreover, Moisio and Kangas (2015) argue that university reform in Finland can be 
understood as an attempt to produce citizen subjects that are entrepreneurial and global 
minded. Thus, it is not just about recruiting international staff but about increasing 
competition in the academic labour market—and creating different kinds of graduates. 
The Ministry of Education’s promotion of international mobility has gone hand in 
hand with systemic reforms of the entire higher education system. The central government 
owned all fourteen universities until 2010, when they were made into independent 
foundations or corporations. The reform reorganized universities’ financing, administration, 
and direction and consolidated their role in “the innovation system” (Ministry of Education 
2009). Since then, managerial techniques and neoliberal rationales of innovation, global-
mindedness, networking and entrepreneurship pervade Finnish university administration. The 
new university law changed the employment status of university employees, transforming 
them from state to private sector employees. In many universities, the flexibilisation of 
contracts immediately set in motion the cooperation procedure for reducing the personnel 
(Sintonen 2010). Since 2012, the Finnish universities have completed all together 25 
negotiations for layoff and nearly 4000 staff members have lost their permanent or fixed-term 
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jobs (Liiten 2016). While holding an important place in Finland’s “innovation economy,” 
these institutional changes have made highly skilled work more precarious. 
Changing contract conditions has come alongside efforts to make Finnish knowledge 
workers more globally minded and more mobile, as well as recruiting foreign students and 
workers to universities. The 2010 university reforms used financial incentives, in particular, 
to push certain priorities, especially hiring international staff and publishing in internationally 
ranked journals. The Ministry of Education compensates departments for completed degrees 
and the publication of research: a non-citizen’s Doctoral Degree compensation is fifty percent 
higher than a Finnish one, and publications are compensated based on a three-tiered scale that 
privileges English over Finnish-language ISI journals (Ministry of Education and Culture 
2015; Paasi 2015). These changes have encouraged Universities to recruit foreign researchers 
and teachers through strategic recruiting packages to attract international talent. External 
funders (Academy of Finland, EU) also require international mobility as a condition of many 
grants. Between 2010 and 2013, the employment of foreign scholars in universities increased 
from 12 % to 18 percent (Läärä, 2014), yet a majority have short term contracts (Pekkola et 
al. 2015). TCNs, in particular, are precarious because their residence permit depends on work 
contract: “I have only limited time contracts, and I'm always afraid I would lose my job and 
then [be] expelled from Finland. I fully depend on my supervisor and I don't know what I 
would do if he decides not to prolong my contract” (a respondent, Hoikka 2016: 68). While 
highly skilled researchers do not face the same vulnerabilities to physical abuse, 
underpayment and overwork as low skilled migrant workers, it is important to trace how 
financial incentives for hiring practices make highly skilled worker mobile and that mobility 
requires transboundary mobility, in particular. In other words, ‘internationalization’ requires 
and reproduces national borders to define highly skilled labour. The border is therefore 
essential to the production of human capital in Finnish economic restructuring. The 
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mobilization and casualization of higher education workers contribute to the production of a 
“spectrum of precarity” (Lewis et al. 2015), a spectrum further complicated by the blurring of 
skilled and unskilled labour for many mobile workers (Mezzadra & Nielson 2013). Here we 
analyse to other positions on Finland’s spectrum of precarity to show how the labour mobility 
requires the strategic territorialisation of workplaces and employment rights. 
OFFSHORING AND OUTSOURCING MOBILE LABOUR: FINNAIR 
“It is crucial to understand that only a company that is profitable on a commercial 
basis will employ people now and in the future. In the course of increasing 
globalization, Finland as a border state of global markets is depended on general 
economic development.” (Heidi Hautala, Minister of Development, Interrogatory 
761/2013; translated from Finnish by author). 
Finnair stands as a symbol of Finland’s high service quality and plays an important role in 
imaginaries of national Finnish identity (Wegg 1983). As a state majority-owned corporation, 
Finnair’s labor mobility practices have been discussed widely in both Finnish Parliament and 
the media: between 1998 and 2014, sixty Parliamentary Interrogatoriesi  focused on Finnair. 
We focus on these here because these debates capture ongoing struggles over labor, mobility, 
and rights in the context of the institutional, human capital, and economic restructuring 
described above. Finnair’s labour practices show how national borders produce socio-spatial 
inequalities by differentiating between mobile workers and by moving and fixing workplaces 
in particular ways. As Mezzadra and Nielson (2013) have argued, we show globalized value 
chains require fixed borders in order to mobilize both labor and capital, but we take their 
argument further to show how states also take an active role in this process. In this case, we 
argue that the Finnish state actively works as shareholder and labour mobility manager for its 
business interests, elaborating other ways in which Finland’s competitive state policies 
require the mobilization of labor and bordering of workplaces in specific ways.  
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The company (Aero Oy until 1953) was established by Bruno Lucander in 
collaboration with German aircraft manufacturer Flugzeugwerke AG as a limited corporation 
in 1923 in Helsinki, seven years after Finland gained independence from Russia (Wegg 1983: 
21; Finnair 2015). In the post-World War II economic environment it was difficult to 
maintain a viable privately-owned company in Finland, however, and in 1946 the Finnish 
government become a 70% shareholder in Finnair (Wegg 1983: 87). This was part of a wider 
trend of state investments in strategic infrastructures and industries in Finland and across 
Europe. Finnair was listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1989, and the Finnish state 
continues to be a majority shareholder (55.8% in 2015). In Finland, as elsewhere, Finland’s 
deep recession and preparation for EU membership in the 1990s challenged Keynesian and 
interventionist state policies resulting in institutional reforms, the commercialization of 
public services, privatization and outsourcing (Ahlqvist & Moisio 2014; Patomäki 2007: 144; 
Kananen & Kantola 2013; OECD 2003). Competition from low-cost airlines and 11 
September provoked many airlines to consolidate and form alliances and joint ventures 
(Finnair 2015). For Finnair as other companies, labour negotiations and the strategic use of 
national borders have been important to cutting labour costs.  
In 2015, Finnair employed 4817 employees (Finnair 2016), 337 of whom were 
employed through staffing agencies outside of Finland and 536 of whom are directly 
employed by Finnair and working outside of Finland.ii Finnair recruited new cabin crew by 
subcontracting with international staffing companies such as Adecco and FASCO. When 
Finnair announced it would contract with Thailand’s temporary staffing firm to employ cabin 
crew on the routes between Bangkok and Hong Kong, MPs demanded explanation 
(Interrogatory  46/2002). Thai and Chinese personnel’s salaries were considerably lower than 
those guaranteed in Finnish collective agreements. Simultaneously, Finnair decided to furlow 
Finnish cabin crew for a period of four weeks. Finnair justified recruitment of Chinese and 
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Thai flight attendants as a security and service quality policy, but MPs have repeatedly 
criticized this move as a displacement of Finnish workers by less expensive—and less 
protected—workers. In response, Finnish ministers have argued that the role of majority 
stakeholder was not to impose personnel policies nor interrupt the firm’s management, 
arguing that Parliamentary Interrogatories pertained only to liabilities of state ownership, not 
to company policies:  
“Finnair Oyj is an independent incorporated company, which, in its activation, 
follows amongst other things the principles of stock markets and the Companies Act. 
It is the responsibility of company’s management team to take care that the 
company’s management is organized properly. The topic of the Interrogatory pertains 
to the liabilities of the company’s management, which are not issues that should be 
discussed in general meeting or taken care in the government.” (Response from 
Minister, Interrogatory 280/2002 vp, The personnel policy of Finnair; translated from 
Finnish by author) 
Here Finnish economic policy ministers work as interested shareholders, confirming the 
distinction between state and private sector. Ten years later, however, Parliamentary debates 
focused on the content of Chinese workers’ contracts, which contained provisions allowing 
Finnair to dismiss staff on the basis of pregnancy, sexual orientation, participation in 
industrial action or marriage to a foreign citizen, all considered “serious violations of human 
rights” in Finnish and EU law. Finnair promised to bring the contracts in line with Finland’s 
human rights commitments, but the incident made clear the extent to which Finnair employed 
country-specific contracts and wages, relying upon national borders to segment its 
international workforce.    
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This strategy became visible again, when Finnair applied to employ American 
personnel on its Helsinki-New York route. The Helsinki Work and Employment Office 
rejected the application for work permits, noting that it was possible to find English-speaking 
personnel from EU and ETAea in a reasonable time; Finnair then changed the recruitment 
announcement to require ability to work from New York (and therefore American 
authorization for Finnish cabin crew to work in the USA). Moving the jurisdiction of the 
workplace itself, contract terms and social benefits were then negotiated according to weaker 
US and New York work contracts. The timing and content of the announcements suggests 
that the outsourcing was also used as a strategy to negotiate the rules and condition of the 
labour and put pressure on trade unions in Finland. In 2014 Finnair announced that it has 
signed an agreement with the Norwegian crew management company OSM Aviation on 
outsourcing of cabin service for Finnair's routes to Hong Kong and Singapore (Iho, 2014). 
The pressure put on trade unions and citizen workers, the conflict over the suitability, 
qualities and demands of “Finnish labor” versus the international labor, exemplifies how 
“migration answers [national labor markets’] established modes of differentiation” allowing 
the Finnish state to be “more adaptable, sly, and fragmented than the limited and sovereign 
community” imagined as its subjects (Mezzadra and Nielson 2013: 162, 165). In this case, 
Finnish economic and migration ministers multiply and expand Finnair’s labor market 
precisely through the territorialization of legal jurisdiction, citizenship status, and the 
workplace itself. 
Despite the transnational mobility required of Finnair cabin crew, and the mobility of 
the workplace itself, labour protections adhere to the jurisdiction in which workers are 
recruited. Here, the state remains a key actor in the multiplication of labour, enforcing the 
limitation of contractual obligations to particular jurisdictions. As a majority state-owned 
company, Finnair’s use of outsourcing and offshoring shows how competing understandings 
 25 
 
of the state’s obligation to employ Finnish citizens and the state’s obligation to produce a 
competitive economy come into conflict. As a shareholder, the Finnish state maintains its 
interest in a competitive enterprise, exercising its right not to regulate labour recruitment 
practices as a way of making policy (Lillie 2010). As a labour mobility manager, the Finnish 
state opens up pools of cheaper labour for its competitive industries. Finnair’s outsourcing 
and offshoring practices rely upon—and thereby reproduce—a territorialisation of labour 
protections bound to citizenship. 
RIGHT TO THE FOREST: BERRY-PICKING AS TOURISM 
“I have been working all my life. The life of the poor is a continuous fight, you cannot 
stop. You have to take work where you will get it. Often we poor and non-educated 
people find work only from foreign countries; from countries where workers are 
needed for construction and factories. During my life I have become very familiar 
with the life of a migrant. I have been employed as a migrant worker in Singapore, 
Brunei, Taiwan and South-Korea. Similarly I came to Finland to work, because they 
needed berry-pickers.” (Praisanti Jum-angwa, translated by Heli Kontio 2013)  
From mobilized academic labour to the mobile workers and workplaces of airline cabin crew, 
we now explore how the legal definition of Finnish forests produces berry-picking as non-
work and Thai berry-pickers as highly mobile non-labour. According to “Everyman’s Right,” 
a right protected in Finnish law, everyone may freely pick flowers, wild berries and 
mushrooms in uncultivated lands (Ministry of the Environment 2013), so long as pickers 
incur no more than minor damage and maintain a reasonable distance to private dwellings. 
The boundaries of forest cottages’ private space is not statutorily stated, but are implicit 
understandings passed down through family berry-picking traditions. If berry-picking is not a 
person’s primary employment and berries are sold without processing, earnings from forest 
berry-picking are not taxed as income, allowing people in peripheral areas extra income. 
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Finland has only recently urbanized, raising wealth and incomes, leading to decreased interest 
in physically demanding forest berry-picking. Each summer, newspapers carry editorials 
decrying unpicked berries in the forests and read this refusal to pick as indicative of cultural 
decline or shifting national priorities (e.g., Korpelainen 2012). Whether or not more berries 
go unpicked, the practice of seasonal berry collection is hearkened as an important cultural 
practice, and changes in the ways that berries are harvested are interpreted as changes to the 
fabric of social life. 
Simultaneously, the international berry market has grown rapidly in recent years. 
Finland’s EU membership increased competition with other EU countries, and the 
globalization of agricultural trade has put Finnish berries in direct competition with berries 
from other parts of the world. As it has been shown in the case of Finland and Sweden, the 
forest berry industry is characterized by buyer-driven global value chain and there is a high 
competition in the markets which increase the demand for low-paid workforce (Eriksson & 
Tollefsen 2013; Rantanen & Valkonen 2011). Finnish berries are sold fresh in markets during 
the summer months, but the majority are processed into ingredients or other products. Every 
summer berry companies invite 12 000-15 000 seasonal migrants, mostly from Ukraine and 
Thailand, to harvest in Finland. Ukrainians tend to work on berry farms with contracts 
(Rantanen & Valkonen 2011: 2). Because farms are considered cultivated, improved land and 
therefore private, they are legally different spaces to forests; berry-picking on cultivated land 
is therefore subject to taxation and workplaces protections. Thai berry-pickers, in contrast, 
tend to work in forests uncultivated, semi-public lands, as described above. As such, forest 
berry-pickers work without contracts, workplace protections, or hourly wages. They are paid 
by weight not wages, are formally considered “self-employed”, and do not have work 
contracts (or workplaces protections). Thus, the legal definition of the forest as a non-
workplace bears directly on the precarity of TCN labour in this sector. 
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In 2005, the first wild-berry-pickers arrived from Thailand, 88 in total. Both the 
pickers and companies reported high yields, and now approximately 4,000 Thai people per 
year work as berry-pickers. Whereas farm-based berry-pickers can work without residence 
permits for up to three months and are regulated by Aliens Act 81 § (549/2010), the legal 
definition of forests as non-workplaces—and labour within them as non-work—places forest 
berry-pickers outside the Aliens Act. Legal rulings have upheld the special legal status of 
Finnish forests (and it should be noted that Sweden also has an everyman’s right but decided 
that wild berry-pickers selling to companies would have work contracts). Each year, the 
Finnish government publishes seasonal work visa requirements for companies, specifying the 
process of recruitment, deadlines, and requirements that labourers have return air tickets, 
disposable income to support themselves on arrival, and adequate travel insurance to cover 
medical or death expenses (Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland, 2016). Thai berry-pickers 
take loans for these up-front expenses, and are expected to repay them from their earnings. 
They sell berries to one of Finland’s major companies, the majority of whom specialize in 
freezing and packaging. The distinction is important because Thai migrant workers do not 
have formal work contracts with Finnish berry companies nor with coordinators. Rather they 
apply for Schengen Area visas as “entrepreneurs”, even though they must provide evidence 
of recruitment by a specific coordinator. Utilizing finely grained legal distinctions in this 
way, Finnish berry companies and recruiters are able to avoid responsibility for work 
conditions for Thai migrant workers.  
In addition, berry-pickers are prohibited from working for other berry companies and 
cannot seek other work while in Finland.  Not only does this make TCN berry-pickers 
dependent on their non-employer, it makes low-yield years particularly problematic. Thai 
berry-pickers take on debt to finance their visas, travel, and living costs and must repay it 
from their proceeds. The situation escalated in 2013 when berry yields were so low that 
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pickers did not make enough to recover their costs, leaving them in debt. A group of forest 
berry-pickers applied for the assistance as victims of human trafficking, which was later 
rejected by the Finnish authorities. The Ombudsman for Minorities in Finland (2014: 54) 
criticized the situation in the Annual Report on Human-trafficking; similarly, the European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI 2013) highlighted Thai recruitment for 
forest berry-picking as a violation of the Employment Contracts Act (55/2001). The Food 
Industry Organization and the Association of Natural Products, however, defended the 
special legal void surrounding TCN berry-pickers: in a statement for the Finnish Parliament , 
the trade organization emphasized that “the Finnish wild-berry stock competes with Swedes, 
Russian, Ukrainian and others” and that if “berries cannot be produced with competitive price 
in Finland, they will be purchased from elsewhere” (Juutinen, Vasuranta & Lukkarinen, 
K19/2014: 2-3). They go on to argue that work contracts would create various extra costs and 
taxation for both migrants and employers. The statement claims that forcing companies to 
prevent “the artificial activities of human trafficking” would endanger the whole industrial 
and commercial activity based on Finland’s forest berries. Here, the special legal status of 
Finnish forests works to produce a territorial competitive advantage, mobilizing TCN 
labour—legally constituted as entrepreneurship—to keep Finnish berries cheap(er). 
Protectionists have questioned companies’ possible abuse of Everyman’s Right in 
Parliament (Interrogatory 866/2008) and in the social media, where nationalist and 
protectionist discourse has been virulent. Conflicts and mistrust among people living in and 
near forests and Thai berry-pickers have arisen over the unwritten rules associated with 
everyman’s right, and some have questioned whether foreigners can exercise everyman’s 
right. It is common practice to leave berries near homes for the residents to pick, but 
companies and coordinators have not informed migrant berry-pickers about these practices. 
In addition, hiring groups of pickers means that there are simply more people in the some 
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areas of the forest. changing the sense of solitude many Finns seek in secluded cottages. But 
critics have also asked whether companies abuse everyman’s right to wild berries, since these 
are intended to be available to the public for individual income generation, not transnational 
berry production. To address problems raised by pickers and forest residents, representatives 
of the Ministry of Employment and Economy and thirteen berry-picking companies signed in 
a letter of intent that sets out improvements, proper guidance on everyman’s’ rights and 
responsibilities, insurance, physical examination, and minimum standards for the conditions 
of work. While the agreement does not clarify the official employment status of TCN berry-
pickers, the Finnish embassy in Bangkok will not entertain visa applications for workers from 
companies who have not signed the agreement (Ministry of Employment and Economy, 
2014). Employer responsibility can be seen as a “soft law” technique to govern the conditions 
of a highly particular form of work. Thai forest-berry-pickers find themselves paradoxically 
mobilised by a Schengen visa in order to work as unemployed persons in a non-workplace, a 
seeming legal void codified in law and upheld by judicial rulings. For TCN berry-pickers, 
Schengen, Finnish, and forest boundaries intersect to produce a particularly precarious legal 
classification of workers, workplaces, and berry-picking. 
CONCLUSION 
In this article we have juxtaposed these three mobile labour practices—knowledge 
workers, airline cabin crew, and berry-pickers—because they demonstrate how labour is 
differentiated and mobilized while conditions of work are strategically territorialized. These 
cases show how well-documented capital and labour mobility practices like offshoring, 
outsourcing, and international recruiting articulate with highly localized juridico-political 
contexts. Although the groups can be categorized according to skill and wage level (cf. Paul, 
2015), spatial strategies and national bordering create differentiations and similarities which 
cannot be explained by the skill level only. Our point is that these juridico-political categories 
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and the strategic territorialisation of borders spacings do the work of multiplying and 
differentiating labour and borders, of particularizing what many have argued is a 
generalizable condition of contemporary labour: precarity. 
In the case of Finnair, companies outsource labour recruitment to jurisdictions where 
workers do not enjoy equal protections to Finnish workers, pressuring Finnish labour unions 
to accept contract conditions below what would be acceptable to their members. For TCN 
berry-pickers, the legal status of the work derives from its location in nominally public forest, 
exempting these migrants from contracted work relationships. From the companies’ 
perspectives, it is a similar strategy to offshoring because uncultivated wild berries create an 
exceptional legal space through which companies can keep labour cheap. Berry-pickers are, 
however, recruited from abroad to perform highly localized labour, a form of labour that has 
symbolic meaning in Finnish national mythology. Meanwhile, researchers and skilled 
labourers are also actively recruited from abroad to increase university competitiveness, but 
do so on short-term contracts and residency permits.  International researchers and students 
have a relatively easy time gaining access to universities, but once in Finland, their privileged 
status is predicated on their foreignness and so their long-term status remains precarious. In 
addition, this strategic incorporation of foreignness necessitates either a churn of temporary 
foreign researchers or long-term residents who do not integrate and seek citizenship. We have 
shown that not only are TCN migration policies nested in supranational EU policymaking 
and national admission policies, but the presence of foreign workers in Finnish forests have 
also ignited debates over Finnish identity in the context of globalization. Thus, the very 
localized character of agricultural labour is not nested within or under national and 
international regulatory regimes, but works through the strategic territorialisation of legal 
distinctions and national borders.  Together, the cases show how a range of actors produce 
and contest the mobilization of labour and territorialization of workplaces. In all three cases, 
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national borders work to enable this in different ways, elaborating how labour and borders 
are multiplied to produce heterogeneous global space.  
Through these three cases, we have shown how different kinds of borders—legal, 
institutional, regional, national, and everyday—overlap with each other in ways that produce 
context-specific forms of precarity for differently skilled TCNs in Finland. EU labour 
mobility has created complex relationships between national, EU, and non-EU workers and 
have produced new vulnerabilities for TCNs relative to their European counterparts. 
Crucially, differences in legal status of both workers and work spaces are mobilized 
strategically by states and employers. In Finland, state and private sector interests have more 
or less aligned towards creating competitiveness in all sectors, and this means that gaps in 
labour protections and precarious visa renewal processes come to be understood as necessary 
for economic growth.  As our analysis shows, however, competitiveness rationalities have not 
gone without contest in the realm of migration policy, as particular policies have been 
challenged from both universalist human rights perspectives and nationalist appeals to 
Finnish cultural traditions. As the EU faces fundamental questions about its coherence, the 
internal migration regime and regulation of TCNs have become the cornerstone questions in 
nationalist protectionist debates, which often derive their power from seemingly local 
struggles over labour like forest berry-picking. The strategic territorialisation of borders by 
both state and non-state actors will continue to be central for understanding the conditions 
and politics of migration, labour, and precarity. 
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i An Interrogatory is a parliamentary procedure in which a set of written questions are presented to the 
governments or to a minister by a member(s) of the opposing party in order to gain more information about the 
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activities or planned activities of the government and their legality or to ask how the government will address 
pressing social problems. Ministers have 21 days to reply.  
ii Finnair does not collect statistics on the nationality of its employees and so these numbers do not detail EU 
or TCN employees working in Finland nor Finnish employees working abroad. The 337 hired through 
international staffing agencies are TCN employees. 
